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Municipal Bonds and the
Contract Clause: Looking
Beyond United States
Trust Company v. New Jersey
By THOMAS R. HURST*
Introduction
For the first time in over a generation, the security of municipal bonds
is in doubt. Throughout the post-World War II era and until recent years, the
debt obligations of state and local governments have been regarded as
among the most secure of all investments. The mid-1970's, however, have
witnessed defaults and near-defaults on municipal bonds to an extent not
encountered since the Great Depression.
Most notable has been the financial difficulty of New York City, which
has been on the brink of default on several occasions during recent years. On
one such occasion, the city was saved from default only by a legislatively-
declared moratorium on payment of principal and interest on several of its
outstanding obligations.' This moratorium was later held unconstitutional
by the New York Court of Appeals. 2 In addition to New York City's
financial difficulties, several special purpose governmental units of New
York state,3 and even the state itself,4 have been in danger of insolvency
from time to time during the last several years. Less notable, but almost as
serious, have been the financial difficulties of several other large cities,
including Boston,5 Philadelphia, 6 Detroit, 7 Cleveland and Yonkers. 9 While
* B.A., 1966, University of Wisconsin; J.D., 1969, Harvard University; member, Wis-
consin Bar. Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1. 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 874, as amended by 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 875. See generally
Shalala & Bellamy, A State Saves a City, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1119.
2. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848,
390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1975, at 28, col. 3 (New York Urban Development
Corporation); id., Nov. 11, 1974, at 19, cal. 2 (New York Mortgage Finance Agency).
4. See, e.g., id., June 2, 1975, at 16, col. 1.
5. See, e.g., id., Apr. 15, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
6. See, e.g., id., Jan. 20, 1976, at 31, cal. 3. See also id., Feb. 3, 1976, at 29, col. 2
(Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency).
7. See, e.g., id., Mar. 25, 1976, at 25, col. 1.
8. See, e.g., Id., June 19, 1975, at 1, col. 6; id., May 27, 1976, at 32, cal. 1.
9. See, e.g., id., Dec. 15, 1975, at 7, col. 1.
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default is not yet a serious threat for any of these municipalities, each has,
on occasion, found the money markets closed to it because of investor con-
cern about the soundness of its financial affairs.
These problems seem likely to continue, if not to intensify, over the
next decade.' 0 Many of the cities currently in financial difficulty face the
prospect of continuing increases in maintenance and service costs which are,
to a large extent, uncontrollable. This, coupled with a declining tax base and
tax rates which cannot be further increased without driving even more
industries out of the city, ensure that the financial problems of munici-
palities will continue. Furthermore, at the same time that revenue sources
are becoming static or declining, the cities are facing increasing pressures to
become involved in such deficit-generating activities as mass transit, wel-
fare and urban renewal. Only with greatly increased federal and state aid,
which seems unlikely to materialize, can many older cities avoid the threat
of insolvency.
These strains on the finances of state and local governmental entities
are likely to place growing pressures on state legislatures to enact laws
detrimental to the interests of the bondholders and other creditors of such
entities. In drastic situations, where the emergency is extreme and im-
mediate legislative action is required to stave off pending bankruptcy, such
laws are likely to take the form of a primary impairment of the bondholders'
rights, such as suspension of the right to collect interest or principal pay-
ments when due. More often, however, the proposed legislation is likely to
take the form of a secondary impairment of the bondholders' rights, such as
dilution of the security for payment of the obligations or modification of the
bondholders' remedies. 1 While such secondary impairments may have no
immediate effect on the bondholders' rights, in the long run their effects
may be no less drastic than that of legislation which creates a primary
impairment. In fact, the latter type of legislation may be the more deleteri-
ous of the two and may constitute the most serious threat to the stability of
the market for municipal debt obligations. Nevertheless, since such laws
may have no immediate effect on the bondholders' receipt of timely pay-
ments of interest and principal, they may be more politically palatable and
thus easier to enact. In contrast, legislation immediately suspending or
otherwise abridging the bondholders' right to receive timely payments of
principal and interest is likely to be politically acceptable only in periods of
dire emergency.
10. See generally Blaydon & Gilford, Financing the Cities, 1976 DuKE L.J. 1057; Wall St.
J., Sept. 30, 1976, at 10, col. 2.
11. See, e.g., W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); Louisiana v. Pilsbury,
105 U.S. 278 (1882); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867).
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In this context, the Supreme Court's decision in United States Trust
Company v. New Jersey12 is one of the most significant opinions handed
down during its 1976 term. In an apparent reversal of the trend established
by several earlier decisions, 13 the Court held that the New Jersey legisla-
ture's repeal of a covenant protecting bondholders of the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey violated the contract clause of the United States
Constitution. 14 The balance of this paper will analyze this opinion and
attempt to assess its significance in the context of the Court's development
and interpretation of that clause.
I. The United States Trust Case
A. The Facts
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is an agency that was
established by both states in 1921 in order to effectuate "a better coordina-
tion of the terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce in,
about and through the port of New York."' 5 The Authority possesses no
taxing power and is unable to pledge the credit of either state. 16 Thus, from
the outset, it has had to rely on loans from private investors and the revenues
generated by its own activities in order to finance its operations.
The Authority has proved to be highly successful financially; in addi-
tion to activities connected with the Port of New York, its operation of the
tunnels and bridges spanning the Hudson River proved to be highly lucra-
tive.17 This was due largely to the policy followed by the directors of the
Authority, which required that each project it undertook should be self-
supporting.'" Because the Port Authority was dependent not only on reve-
nues generated from its own activities but also the willingness of investors to
subscribe to its debt obligations, it was especially solicitous in protecting the
interests of those investors. In 1930, legislation was passed by both states
creating a General Reserve Fund from all surplus revenues derived by the
12. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
13. *See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City
of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934).
14. 431 U.S. at 32.
15. 1921 N.J. Laws, ch. 151, p. 143; 1921 N.Y. Laws, ch. 154, p. 492. The consent of
Congress to each and every article of this interstate compact was obtained, effective August 23,
1921. PUB. REs. No. 17, ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174 (1921).
16. 1921 N.J. Laws, ch. 151, art VII; 1921 N.Y. Laws, ch. 154, art. VII.
17. See generally Goldstein, An Authority in Action-An Account of the Port of New York
Authority and Its Recent Activities, 26 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 715, 717 (1961).
18. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 140, 338 A.2d 833, 841 (1975),
aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd sub nom. United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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Authority in an amount equal to ten percent of the par value of all outstand-
ing bonds, and pledging this fund as security for those bonds then or
thereafter issued by the Authority. 19 Surplus funds in excess of the ten per-
cent requirement were available for use by the Authority in any manner
authorized.
Another significant protection adopted for the benefit of bondholders
was the so-called "1.3 test." This was first utilized in 1952, when the
Authority began to issue "consolidated bonds" secured by all revenues
generated by its operations, rather than by the revenues generated by a
specific project. The 1.3 test
prohibits the issuance of new consolidated bonds unless the best
one-year net revenues of all of the Port Authority's facilities equal
or are greater than 1.3 times the prospective debt service for the
calendar year during which the debt service of all outstanding and
proposed new bonds secured by a pledge of the general reserve
fund would be at a maximum. The 1.3 test is thus an equation in
which one component consists of the Authority's net revenues
from all facilities, and the other component is the maximum annu-
al debt, service required to be paid on all Authority bonds, includ-
ing the new bonds to be issued. The maximum annual debt service
component is readily calculable from the requirements set forth in
the bond issues.2"
In addition, section seven of the Consolidated Bond Resolution pro-
hibited the issuance of additional bonds secured by the General Reserve
Fund unless the Authority certified that, in its opinion, the issuance of
additional bonds would not materially impair its sound credit standing or the
investment status of the consolidated bonds during the ensuing decade.
21
Attempts to involve the Port Authority in mass transit activities date
back at least as far as 1927.22 Serious efforts in this direction did not
commence until the late 1950's, however, following the bankruptcy of the
Hudson and Manhattan Railroad, a commuter line that linked Manhattan
with the New Jersey suburbs.23 In 1958, the commissioners of the Port
Authority teshfied that no plan that would involve the Authority in deficit-
ridden mass rail transit activities would be acceptable unless it included
some sort of protection for existing bondholders. Absent such protection, it
was asserted that any additional bonds issued by the Authority would
become unmarketable.24 In 1961, the New York Legislature passed a mea-
sure providing for the operation of the Hudson and Manhattan by the Port
19. 1931 N.J. Laws, ch. 5; 1931 N.Y. Laws, ch. 4.
20. 134 N.J. Super. at 144, 338 A.2d at 843.
21. Id. at 145-46, 338 A.2d at 845.
22. See id. at 149, 338 A.2d at 846.
23. Id. at 150, 338 A.2d at 847.
24. Id. at 150-51, 338 A.2d at 849-52.
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Authority, but the bill contained no covenant protecting creditors, and the
New Jersey Legislature failed to pass reciprocal legislation for that reason.
25
In 1962, both legislatures did pass an enactment authorizing the Port
Authority to acquire the Hudson and Manhattan; the law also contained the
covenant in question in the present case, which limited Port Authority
financial involvement. 26 The covenant effectively precluded the Authority
from acquiring any mass transit facilities other than the Hudson and Manhat-
tan, since such facilities would almost surely be plagued by substantial
deficits that were forbidden by the carefully drawn terms of the covenant. 27
25. Id. at 151-53, 338 A.2d at 848-49.
26. 1961 N.J. Laws, ch. 8, § 6 (repealed 1974); 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 209, § 6, as amended
by 1972 N.Y. Laws, ch. 1003, § 1 (repealed 1974). A constitutional challenge to this legislation
was initiated but proved unsuccessful, because the New York Court of Appeals asserted that
the 1962 law clearly fell within the Congressional consent given in 1921. See note 15 supra.
Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379,391, 190 N.E.2d 402,406,
240 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963). See also Port Auth. Bondhold-
ers Protective Comm'n v. Port of New York Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1967); Kheel v.
Port of New York Auth., 331 F. Supp. 118, 120 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd on other grounds,
457 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972).
27. The relevant part of the covenant reads as follows:
The 2 states covenant and agree with each other and with the holders of any
affected bonds, as hereinafter defined, that so long as any of such bonds remain
outstanding and unpaid and the holders thereof shall not have given their consent...
(b) neither the States nor the Port Authority, nor any subsidiary corporation incor-
porated for any of the purposes of this act will apply any of the rentals, tolls, fares,
fees, charges, revenues or reserves, which have been or shall be pledged in whole or in
part as security for such bonds, for any railroad purposes whatsoever other than
permitted purposes hereinafter set forth.
Consolidated Bond Resolution, § 6, quoted in United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super.
124, 161, 338 A.2d 833, 854 (1975) aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253,353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd. sub
nom. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
The "permitted purposes" definition included (in addition to Hudson & Manhattan) only
(I) those passenger railroad facilites which the Port Authority certified were "self-supporting"
or (2) those not so certified, but only if the Port Authority stipulated that at the end of the
preceding calendar year the General Reserve Fund contained the prescribed statutory amount
(10% of all outstanding Authority bonds) and that all of the Authority's passenger railroad
revenues, including those of any proposed acquisition, would not produce deficits in excess of
"permitted deficits" as defined in the covenant. See 134 N.J. Super. at 161-62, 338 A.2d at 854.
The term "self-supporting" referred to a facility where the "estimated average annual net
operating income for the next ten years of operations is at least equal to the estimated average
annual debt service on bonds issued in connection with the facility." Id. at 162, 338 A.2d at 855.
The term "permitted deficit" meant
a deficit which does not exceed (A) the amount of the passenger railroad deficit the
payment of which one or both states is willing to guarantee for the period for which the
Authority would be liable for such deficit, plus (B) the greater of (1) an amount equal
to 10% of the general reserve fund at the end of the preceding calendar year less an
amount equal to 1% of the Authority's bonds outstanding at the end of the preceding
calendar year which were issued for passenger rail purposes (including the H & M), or
(2) an amount equal to 10% of the amount calculated under clause (1) plus 1% of the
Authority's equity in all facilites other than passenger rail facilities.
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Subsequently, the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad was acquired by the
Authority through its wholly owned subsidiary, Port Authority Trans-Hud-
son Corporation (PATH). Its operation proved to be even more unprofitable
than had been originally forecast. Its accumulated operating deficits totalled
$125,000,000 at the time the suit in question was commenced. 28 Nonethe-
less, pressures developed for further expansion of the PATH system. In
1973, bi-state legislation was passed authorizing such expansion and, in
addition, making the 1962 covenant inapplicable with respect to bonds
issued subsequent to the effective date of the new legislation.29 For various
reasons, however, this legislation was never implemented. Finally, in 1974,
a new bi-state enactment was passed, after the OPEC oil embargo and the
increased public awareness of the energy crisis confronting the nation. This
legislation, which also authorized expansion of the PATH commuter rail-
road system, contained an outright repeal of the 1962 covenant, a repealer
that purported to operate retroactively. 30 This law was the subject of the suit
filed by the United States Trust Company of New York, as indenture trustee
of all bondholders of the Port Authority. The company did not prevail in
state court on its claims based on both the federal and New Jersey constitu-
tions. 31 It then appealed its case to the United States Supreme Court.
B. The Decision of the Court
1. The Issue of an Impairment Vel Non
In deciding the constitutionality of the repealer legislation under the
contract clause, the Court directed its analysis to two major questions: first,
did the repeal of the 1962 covenant "impair" the obligation of the contract
between the Port Authority and its bondholders32 and second, if so, was this
impairment proscribed by the contract clause? 33 This section will discuss the
Court's analysis of the first of these two major issues.
As a preliminary matter, the Court had no difficulty concluding that the
1962 covenant constituted a contract between the holders of Port Authority's
Id. at 162-63, 338 A.2d at 855. The proposed expansion of the Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corporation (PATH) system would not satisfy either of the "permitted purposes" exceptions.
Any extension clearly would not be self-supporting, and PATH operations were already
producing such extensive deficits that the General Reserve Fund did not have any excess
reserves.
28. 134 N.J. Super. at 165, 338 A.2d at 856.
29. 1972 N.J. Laws, ch. 208; 1973 N.Y. Laws, ch. 318.
30. 1974 N.J. Laws, ch. 25; 1974 N.Y. Laws, ch. 993.
31. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 197, 338 A.2d 833, 874 (1975),
aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd sub noam. United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
32. See 431 U.S. at 17-21.
33. See id at 21-28.
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consolidated bonds on the dates between the passage of the covenant in 1962
and its repeal in 1973. 34 Although the language of the contract clause itself
is ambiguous, it was established at an early date in Fletcher v. Peck35 that
the clause was applicable not only to contracts between private parties, but
also to those between the state and its citizens. 36 Since a legislature ordinari-
ly does not bind future assemblies by its actions, however, it must be
determined whether a given piece of legislation constitutes a "contract" so
that it does have a prospectively binding effect.37 As in the case of private
contracts, the Court's primary inquiry is to determine whether the parties
intended to enter into a legally binding contract.38 Here, the Court had little
difficulty in affirming the trial court's finding that the 1962 covenant was
34. The contract clause provides: "No State shall. . . pass any. . . law impairing the
obligation of contracts . . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10. There is little authoritative history
indicating precisely why the Framers included the contract clause in the Constitution. What
authority does exist indicates that the Framers felt it necessary to protect the people from the
whims and caprices of state legislatures which had often, for the sake of political expediency,
altered the legal consequences of pre-existing contracts. See B. WIGHT, THE CONTRAcT
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938); Note, Moratory Legislation, 46 HARv. L. REV. 1061,
1068 (1933). As Chief Justice Marshall said:
mhe framers of the Constitution viewed with some apprehension, the violent acts
which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and that the people of the United
States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield them-
selves and their property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to
which men are exposed.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810). And in the Federalist Papers, James
Madison explained that the people "were weary of the fluctuating policy of state legislatures
and wanted it made clear that under the new Government men could safely rely on States to
keep faith with those who justifiably relied on their promises." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 301
(J. Madison) (Cooke ed. 1961).
Although the ex post facto clause of article I, § 10 might at first appear to comprise an even
more sweeping prohibition against retroactive legislation, the Supreme Court held at an early
date that it applies only to criminal legislation or other legislation penal in nature. Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322-26 (1867); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-91 (1798).
Similarly, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only that retrospec-
tive civil legislation which is unduly harsh and oppressive. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147
(1938). See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 14-20 (1976). As a result, the
contract clause came to bear the major burden of protecting private parties against state
legislation hostile to property rights; indeed, during the nineteenth century, the contract clause
was probably one of the most litigated clauses of the Constitution. See Hale, The Supreme
Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARv. L. REv. 512, 513-14 (1944).
35. 10,U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
36. Id. at 137-39. Accord, New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104, 114 (1877). However, at least
one scholar has concluded that there is no evidence that the Framers of the Constitution ever
intended that the contract clause should be applicable to agreements to which the state is a
party. B. WRIGHT, THE CoNTRAcr CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 15-16 (1938).
37. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135. See generally Kauper, What is a "Contract" Under the
Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution?, 31 MICH. L. REv. 187 (1932).
38. See also Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1938); Dodge v.
Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1937).
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intended to constitute a contract between the two states and the holders of
the consolidated bonds.
39
At this juncture, however, the reasoning of the Court became more
obscure. In virtually all previous cases on the subject, the Court had held
that, even given the existence of a contract, not all legislation that repeals
or modifies a portion of that contract constitutes an impairment. Rather,
only legislation that materially or substantially alters the contract will so
qualify.4° Accordingly, a determination of the materiality of the impairment
has, in the past, been a central feature of the Court's analysis in contract
clause cases. 41 Indeed, this determination was one of the primary issues
discussed by the trial court. That tribunal held that the repeal of the 1962
covenant did not materially undermine the contract so as to fall within the
proscription of the contract clause.42 The trial court found that the original
purchasers of the bonds had relied, to some extent, on the existence of the
covenant in purchasing the bonds and that the market price had fallen after
the repealing legislation was passed. 43 However, it also observed both that
the Port Authority bonds maintained "A" ratings from Moody's and Stand-
ard and Poor's, the two leading investment advisory services, after passage
of the repealer and that the market price of the bonds had risen to a level
comparable to that which had existed prior to the enactment of the 1974
legislation within a few months after the date of that enactment. 44 Thus, the
ultimate conclusion of the trial court was that the plaintiff had not proven
that the market price of the bonds was permanently and adversely affected
by the repeal of the covenant and therefore there was no violation of the
contract clause. 45 The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by
Justice Blackmun, 46 did not dispute the trial court's basic findings of fact,
but nevertheless refused to accept its ultimate conclusion that no material
39. The Court here examined both the language of the bonds themselves and the legisla-
tive history surrounding the passage of the covenant and concluded that both supported its
conclusion that the legislature and the Port Authority intended the covenant to be a "contract"
within the meaning of the contract clause. 431 U.S. at 17-18.
40. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); National Sur. Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co., 226 U.S. 276
(1912); Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. City of Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437 (1903); Von Hoffman v.
City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867); Planters' Bank v. Sharp. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301
(1848).
41. See notes 55-60 and accompanying text infra.
42. 134 N.J. Super. at 196, 338 A.2d at 874.
43. Id. at 180-81, 338 A.2d at 864-65.
44. Id. at 179-82, 338 A.2d at 864-65.
45. Id. at 181-82, 338 A.2d at 866.
46. Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist
and Stevens. 431 U.S. at 3. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices White
and Marshall joined. Id. at 33. Justices Powell and Stewart took no part in the decision of the
case. Id. at 32.
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impairment had resulted.47 The Court justified its conclusion as follows.
First, it said that the covenant was "not superfluous because it did limit the
Port Authority's deficits and protected the General Reserve Fund from
depletion. 48 Second, the covenant was not merely modified or replaced by a
comparable provision but was totally repealed. 49 Finally, the legislature had
not compensated the bondholders adversely affected by its repeal.
50
This line of reasoning marks a significant departure from other recent
contract clause cases and appears to mark a return to a rationale expressed
by the Court early in the nineteenth century, when it at least nominally
appeared to take an absolute view of the contract clause. For example, in
Green v. Biddle,51 the Court on rehearing held unconstitutional a series of
Kentucky laws that impaired the rights of Virginia claimants to Kentucky
lands. Justice Washington, in the majority opinion, presented what may be
the most literal reading of the strictures of the contract clause ever given by
the Court. He stated:
The objection to a law, on the ground- of its impairing the
obligation of a contract, can never depend upon the extent of the
change which the law effects in it. Any deviation from its terms,
by postponing, or accelerating, the period of performance which it
prescribes, imposing conditions not expressed in the contract, or
dispensing with the performance of those which are, however,
minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon the contract
of the parties, impairs its obligation.
52
Two decades later, in Planters' Bank v. Sharp,53 Justice Woodbury used
equally strong language in finding that a state statute infringed the contract
clause:
One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is, that its
value has by legislation been diminished. It is not, by the Constitu-
tion, to be impaired at all. This is not a question of degree or
manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obliga-
tion, dispensing with any part of its force.
54
Nevertheless, although language in some of its decisions supports an ab-
solutist view of the contract clause, the Court has not always followed this
interpretation. In Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy,55 bonds were issued by a
city pursuant to an Illinois law that authorized the levying of a special
47. Id. at 17-28.
48. Id. at 19.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
52. Id. at 84.
53. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301 (1848).
54. Id. at 327. See also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 256 (1827).
55. 71 U.S. 535 (1867).
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property tax in an amount sufficient to pay interest on the bonds and placed
the proceeds thus collected in a segregated fund for the sole benefit of
bondholders. Subsequently, the legislature enacted a statute that limited the
rate of the property tax that could be levied by municipalities and repealed
the prior law allowing a special levy for the benefit of bondholders. The
Court held this statute unconstitutional, but, in so doing, it did not employ
the absolute language seen in prior opinions: "It is competent for the states
to change the form of remedy, or to modify it otherwise as they may see fit,
provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired.
• . . Every case must be determined upon its own circumstances." 56 Simi-
larly, in his opinion for the majority in the original decision in Green v.
Biddle,5 Justice Story stated the governing test as follows: "If those acts so
change the nature and extent of existing remedies, as materially to impair
the rights and interests of the owner, they are just as much a violation of the
compact, as if they directly overturned his rights and interests."
'58
In the most recent contract clause case involving municipal bonds, the
Court also appeared to apply a less than absolute test. W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh59 involved a challenge by bondholders to an Arkansas statute
that substantially modified the procedures available to them against a muni-
cipal improvement district that had defaulted on its bonds. The legislature
had reduced the interest and penalties payable on default, increased the time
in which the property was to be sold for nonpayment from sixty-five days to
thirty-two months and permitted the property owner to remain in possession
with a right of redemption for a further period of four years without having
to account for rents received. The Court held that this legislation violated the
contract clause, stating that "[w]ith studied indifference to the interests of
the mortgagee or to his appropriate protection [the legislature has] taken
from the mortgage the quality of an acceptable investment for a rational
investor.' '6 It then went on to state:
Whether one or more of the changes effected by these statutes
would be reasonable and valid if separated from the others, there
is no occasion to consider. . . . The changes of remedy now
challenged as invalid are to be viewed in combination, with the
cumulative significance that each imparts to all. So viewed they
are seen to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of
nearly all the incidents that give attractiveness and value to collat-
eral security.
61
56. Id. at 553-54. See also Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 601 (1878).
57. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
58. Id. at 17. A more absolute view of the contract clause was stated in the same case on
rehearing in an opinion authored by Justice Johnson. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
59. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
60. Id. at 60.
61. Id. at 62.
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For the past century the Court thus appears to have required some
showing that the alleged impairment is not merely nominal, but "substan-
tial" or "material" in nature. In United States Trust, however, the Court
appears to be abandoning that test in favor of the absolutist interpretation
espoused in Green and Planters' Bank. As noted earlier, the Court now
seems to be saying that as long as the provision is "not superfluous," its
repeal will be held to constitute an impairment unless it is replaced by an
arguably comparable security provision or unless compensation is given to
the bondholders to remunerate them for its value.
62
The lack of a satisfactory explanation by Justice Blackmun in determin-
ing that an impairment existed is perhaps the weakest portion of his opinion.
Nowhere does he attempt to explain his departure from the substantiality or
materiality standards utilized in previous decisions; indeed, he does not
even discuss cases such as Von Hoffman and Worthen in this portion of his
opinion. Instead, he merely adopts a "not superfluous" criterion with little
explanation. 63 Furthermore, the explanation given is unconvincing. First,
the Court appears to deem it important that the provision in question was
totally repealed and not merely modified or replaced by an "arguably
comparable" security provision.' 4 But, in so doing, the Court ignores other
provisions of the bond indenture and of the enabling legislation that could
make the total repeal of the covenant irrelevant. Most important, as the trial
court recognized, the bondholders are still protected by the so-called "1.3
test," which prohibits the Port Authority from issuing new securities unless
its net revenues available for debt service are estimated to be at least 1.3
times greater than the amount needed for all debt service on all outstanding
and proposed bonds.65 While the covenant that was repealed did provide
even greater protection to the bondholders than the 1.3 test, under the
materiality standard of Von Hoffman and Worthen, the Court should have
62. 431 U.S. at 19. The word "superfluous" is defined as "exceeding what is sufficient,
necessary, normal or desirable." WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcriONARY 2294
(1961). This suggests that if a provision of the bond indenture has any possible utility to the
bondholders, its repeal will violate the contract clause, at least if the legislature has made no
effort to substitute another, comparable provision for it. Conceivably, then, a court could find a
protective covenant not to be "material" when viewed in the context of the entire document,
yet still find that it was "not superfluous" because it did provide some increment, however
slight, of additional protection. See notes 69-72, 141-52 and accompanying text infra. By
adopting the stricter "not superfluous" standard, the Court seems to imply that it is not
prepared to apply the normal presumption of constitutionality to lbgislative intervention in or
modification of municipal bond indentures. See notes 158-61 and accompanying text infra. For
possible explanations of the Court's departure from the materiality standard, see notes 69-72,
141-52 and accompanying text infra.
63. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
64. 431 U.S. at 19.
65. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
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at least considered the other protections available to bondholders in deciding
the threshold question of whether there was an impairment. 66
Secondly, the Court's use of the argument that the state had deprived
bondholders of property rights without just compensation in support of its
position on the existence of an impairment vel non involves circular rea-
soning. It is true that the Court has held that the tests imposed under the just
compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment and the contract clause are
similar; thus, a contract right that is protected under the latter clause is a
form of property for which just compensation must be given under the Fifth
Amendment.6 7 Notwithstanding this precedent, the Court's statement that
the repeal of the covenant constituted an impairment because no compensa-
tion was paid to the bondholders is circular because, unless the repeal
actually deprived the bondholders of some property right protected under the
Fifth Amendment's just compensation clause, no compensation was due in
any event. 68 Whether the case is analyzed under the just compensation
clause or under the contract clause, some determination must be made of the
extent of the substantive effect of the repeal on the bondholders' rights. Yet
the Court simply fails to engage in such a determination.
However, it is notable that Justice Blackmun does not repudiate explic-
itly the concept of materiality in this portion of his opinion. Thus, it would
seem presumptuous to conclude that the materiality standard of Von Hoff-
man and Worthen has been rejected, unless no alternative explanation can
plausibly be advanced for the result reached by the Court in this portion of
its opinion. Fortunately, there does appear to be an alternative explanation.
After finding that the covenant was "not superfluous," the Court observes
both that the legislature made no effort to compensate bondholders for its
66. The extent to which the covenant provided greater protection to bondholders than
other available safeguards is not easy to determine. Curiously, there is no direct testimony on
this point in the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the covenant. 134 N.J. Super. at
148-67, 338 A.2d at 949-55. The main difference would seem to be that the 1.3 test depends on
the estimation of future net revenues of the Port Authority. The covenant, however, only
allows acquisition of a passenger railroad by the Port Authority if (1) the Authority certifies that
the railroad is "self-supporting" or (2) deficits generated will not exceed "permitted deficits"
as defined in the covenant. See note 27 supra. Thus, it might be possible for the Port Authority
to acquire legally a deficit-ridden commuter railroad which might, at the time of acquisition,
satisfy the 1.3 test; yet, if the deficits exceeded expectations, as was the case with the Hudson
& Manhattan, the Port Authority could find its credit rating impaired. On the other hand,
acquisition of such a railroad under the covenant would be difficult, if not impossible. A
railroad currently generating a deficit could hardly be certified as "self-supporting" under the
first proviso. Furthermore, since the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad's losses were already
consuming most of the available deficit under the "permitted deficits" proviso, this would not
be available to authorize the acquisition.
67. Pennsylvania Hosp. v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917). See City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 553-54 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
68. East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. &
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repeal and that the covenant was not merely modified or replaced by an
arguably comparable security provision. 69 In effect, then, Justice Blackmun
is saying that since the legislature appeared to be totally unconcerned with
the interests of the bondholders and apparently made no efforts to balance
their interests against those of the state, he and his colleagues would not
bother to engage in a detailed examination of the materiality of the impair-
ment, but would instead presume that an impairment exists.
The language of the Court calls to mind that of W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh.70 There, in invalidating a state law limiting the remedies
available to holders of certain municipal bonds, the Court stated that "[W]ith
studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or to his appropriate
protection [the state has] taken from the mortgage the quality of an accept-
able investment for a rational investor. "71 Thus, what seemed to trouble the
majority in United States Trust, as it did in Worthen, was that the legisla-
ture had acted with no apparent attempt to balance the interests of the
creditors with those of the public at large. In such situations, the Court
seems to be saying that it will not trouble itself with a detailed evaluation of
the materiality or actual adverseness of an impairment when the legislature
itself has made no such evaluation.
72
Ironically, if the Court had found that the legislature had made such a
determination, there would seem to be substantial grounds on which it could
base a conclusion that the legislative judgment to repeal the covenant was
justified. Even though the covenant was abrogated, the bondholders of the
Port Authority were still protected by the safeguard of the 1.3 test 73 and that
of the section 7 certification, both of which have been discussed earlier. 74 In
the Court's view, it was the legislature's failure to engage in this balancing
test or to consider other, less drastic alternatives than total repeal of the
covenant that was fatal.
75
2. The Constitutionality of the Impairment
Had United States Trust arisen a century ago, the Court's inquiry
might well have stopped with the finding of an impairment. In early cases,
Loan Ass'n., 310 U.S. 32 (1940); Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939); Richmond
Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937).
69. 431 U.S. at 19.
70. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
71. Id. at 60.
72. In effect, the Court seems to be reversing the normal presumption of constitutionality
which is ordinarily accorded to acts of Congress. See notes 158-61 and accompanying text
infra.
73. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
74. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
75. Before concluding this section, it should be pointed out that the Court also refused to
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the Court seemed to indicate that once an impairment was found, then it
automatically followed that there was a violation of the contract clause.
76
Over the years, however, the Court came to recognize that in certain
circumstances, the policies that the contract clause was designed to protect
might conflict with what is loosely termed the "police power" of the state.
77
Thus, a mere finding that certain legislation constitutes an impairment does
not always lead to the conclusion that it also violates the contract clause.
Before that determination is made, the courts must balance the interests
protected by that clause against the interests furthered by the police power
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment; if the latter are found to
outweigh the former, then no violation of the contract clause will be found.
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell78 is a seminal case in
base its decision on the right-remedy distinction which had been a popular method of analysis in
older contract clause decisions. This method of analysis distinguished between legislation that
altered a substantive right under the contract, which was forbidden by the contract clause, and
legislation that merely affected the remedy, which was permitted. The distinction was first
clearly articulated by Justice Trimble in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). The
Court has used this distinction to uphold, inter alia, laws abolishing imprisonment for debt,
Maison v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370 (1827), and laws restricting the right of a mortgagee to
a deficiency judgment, Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941); Honeyman v.
Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939); Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937). But see Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
For several reasons, however, the Court has come to discard the right-remedy distinction
in recent years. First, it is apparent that, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, "a right without
a remedy is a meaningless scholasticism ....... Wood & Selick v. Compagnie G~ndrale
Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 943 (2d Cir. 1930). Thus, a severe impairment of the remedy can
render the substantive rights which exist of theoretical value only, since there is no meaningful
way to enforce them. Second, the term "remedy" came to be applied by the Court not merely
to procedural changes but also to certain substantive changes in the promisor's rights as well,
thus blurring the original distinction. See, e.g., W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426
(1934) (law exempting proceeds of insurance policies from attachment for payment of debts of
insured held unconstitutional); Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867) (statute
limiting amount of tax which could be assessed to pay off previously issued bonds held
unconstitutional); Bronson v. Kihzie, 42 U.S. (I How.) 311 (1843) (law restricting price at
foreclosure sale to at least two-thirds of appraised value held unconstitutional). The Court
discussed these cases in terms of the right-remedy distinction even though the statute did not
involve a remedy in the procedural sense at all. Third, the Court has come to recognize that,
whether or not the impairment is one of a remedy or a right is irrelevant in terms of the policies
underlying the contract clause; rather, the materiality of the impairment is the significant factor
in deciding whether the contract clause has been violated. The explicit rejection of the right-
remedy distinction in the Court's two most recent contract clause decisions indicates that the
Court has administered the coup de grace to it. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 19-21 n.17 (1977); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506 (1965).
76. See, e.g., Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301 (1848); Ogden v. Saunders, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
77. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); East New York Sav. Bank
v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
78. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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the modern era of contract clause interpretation, in which the Court explic-
itly recognized that the protection afforded by that clause was not absolute,
but must be reconciled with other, potentially conflicting provisions of the
Constitution. The case involved a challenge to the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Law, enacted in 1933 in the severest part of the Depression to
provide relief to mortgagors who would otherwise have lost their property.
The Act authorized, inter alia, the postponement of foreclosure sales and
the extension of redemption periods at the discretion of the state courts; by
its terms, it was to remain in effect only during the continuance of the
emergency and, in no event, beyond May 1, 1935. It also required the
mortgagor in default who remained in possesion to pay to the mortgagee the
reasonable rental value of the property, -s fixed by a court.7 9 In a five to four
decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this legislation.
Chief Justice Hughes, in the course of his majority opinion, made state-
ments that have been quoted on several occasions by the Court in subsequent
contract clause cases. He noted that "while emergency does not create
power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power."
80
Next, he observed that "the prohibition [of the contract clause] is not an
absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical
formula." ' 81 Third, Chief Justice Hughes stated that "[n]ot only is the
Constitutional provision qualified by the measure of control which the State
retains over remedial processes, but the State also continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It does not matter that
legislation appropriate to that end 'has the result of modifying or abrogating
contracts already in effect.' "82 Applying these principles, the Court pro-
ceeded to sustain the Minnesota mortgage moratoria legislation after find-
ing that: (1) an emergency existed; (2) the legislation was addressed to a
legitimate end; (3) the conditions of the legislation were not unreasonable
because the chief concern of the mortgagees, protection of their investment
security, was not substantially impaired; and (4) the legislation was tempo-
rary, continuing only for the duration of the emergency.
83
The significance of the Blaisdell case in the modem era of contract
clause litigation.cannot be overemphasized. It marked a fundamental change
in the Court's attitude towards the nature and degree of protection provided
by that clause. Prior to Blaisdell, the Court seemed to regard the protec-
79. 1933 Minn. Laws, ch. 339.
80. 290 U.S. at 426.
81. Id. at 428.
82. Id. at 434-35.
83. Id. at 444-47.
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tion of the contract clause as an absolute one, although application of the
threshold requirement of materiality admittedly did afford the Court more
flexibility than it was willing to acknowledge explicitly. The Blaisdell case
marked perhaps the most explicit recognition by the Court that this protec-
tion must be read in the context of the entire constitutional scheme and that
other constitutional safeguards could come into play that would prevent a
rigid application of the contract clause. 84 In particular, the opinion recog-
nized that policy considerations may modify the guarantee of that clause.
Thus, for the first time, the Court expressly adopted a balancing test to
determine whether the contract clause prohibited the legislation being chal-
lenged. This balancing test has been followed by the Court in virtually all
contract clause cases succeeding Blaisdell, until United States Trust . 5 This
interpretation of the contract clause had probably been encouraged by the
tendency of the Court to apply a balancing test to most of the constitutional
protections afforded by the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. s6 As a
result, many had come to believe that the protection afforded by the contract
clause was similar to that afforded by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. s7
The Court in United States Trust justifies its departure from the
Blaisdell rationale on several grounds. First, it painstakingly points out that
when the state impairs the obligation of a contract to which it is a party, it is
necessary to determine whether that contract was of a type wherein it is
proper for a state to bind itself in the future. On this issue, the Court had
little difficulty finding that substantial precedent exists for the state to be
84. The Great Depression of the 1930's and ensuing collapse of real estate prices led to
many attempts by state legislatures to pass legislation to protect the mortgagee from foreclo-
sure, as was the case with the legislation in Blaisdell. These acts met u ith varying degrees of
success in surviving constitutional challenges under the contract clause. See generally Bunn,
The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria, I U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 249-
65 (1933); Skilton, Mortgage Moratoria Since 1933, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 53 (1943).
85. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306
U.S. 539 (1939); Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S.
124 (1937); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
86. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 399 U.S. 36 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
87. 431 U.S. at 60-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, any analogy which might be
drawn between the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments on the one
hand, and the contract clause on the other would appear to be of dubious validity. The very
language "due process of law" would seem to compel a balancing of interests on a case-by-case
basis in order to determine what process is "due" under the circumstances. The contract clause
in contrast, is phrased in rather absolute terms. Its language indicates that the Framers placed a
high value on upholding the integrity of individual decisions made in the free market and
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able to bind itself in the future with respect to matters involving the taxing
and spending powers.8 8 The Court then pointed out that the security provi-
sion impaired by the 1974 repealer was "purely financial" and thus did not
involve a situation in which the state had surrendered an essential attribute
of its sovereignty.8 9 In so characterizing it, the Court managed to distinguish
this case from those such as Stone v. Mississippi,9° in which a state
constitutional provision abolishing lotteries was held not to violate the
contract clause merely because the legislature had previously granted a
charter to a private company to operate a lottery. In cases such as Stone, it
was impossible for the state to exercise its police power to eliminate the
supposed evil of gambling without impairing the previous contract. 91 In
United States Trust, however, the Court seems to say that the interests
served by the contract clause should be paramount because, while the Port
Authority's lucrative revenue-generating operation of tunnels and bridges
was a desirable source of revenue to finance mass transit, it was not the only
source. Thus, there were alternative methods of furthering the police power
interests of New York and New Jersey without impairing the obligations of
existing contracts.
This conclusion does not solve the Court's doctrinal problem, how-
ever, since the mere existence of alternative methods of dealing with the
problems of mass transportation, energy conservation and environmental
protection does not mean that the legislature must choose the least restrictive
of them. In a series of cases, the Court has established that actions by a
legislature that involve economic regulation are entitled to a strong pre-
distrusted subsequent legislative attempts to tamper with such bargains. Thus, applying a
balancing test to the contract clause, particularly if the acts of the legislature were accorded the
normal strong presumption of constitutionality, would render nugatory the protection which the
Framers intended the contract clause to provide. See note 34 supra.
88. Id. at 23-24. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), established early in the
history of the contract clause that the legislature has the power to bind future legislatures if it
intends to do so, at least with respect to certain subjects.
89. 431 U.S. at 24. The Court here cited New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164
(1812), which held that the state could properly grant a permanent tax exemption and that the
contract clause prohibited subsequent legislation impairing that agreement. However, as au-
thority for the proposition.that a legislature does have the power to enter into contracts which
are binding under the contract clause with respect to financial matters, this case is weak
authority. While never expressly overruled, Wilson has been severely limited in subsequent
cases. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Clyde v. Gilchrist, 262 U.S. 94 (1923); Seton Hall College v.
South Orange, 242 U.S. 100 (1916); Rochester Ry. v. Rochester, 205 U.S. 236 (1907); Wisconsin
& Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903); Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U.S. 217 (1876).
90. 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
91. There are several other cases besides Stone in which the Court has invoked the police
power to support impairment of a prior legislative act which might be characterized as contrac-
tual. However, in these cases, unlike the present case, impairment of the contract was essential
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sumption of constitutionality. I As a corollary, the Court has often held that
it is not its responsibility to second guess the legislature concerning the
desirability of various alternative means of solving a problem. 9 Thus, based
on precedent, it would not have been surprising for the Court to have held
the repealer valid on the theory that it could not substitute its judgment for
that of the duly-elected legislatures of New York and New Jersey. Notwith-
standing such precedent, Justice Blackmun indicated that "complete defer-
ence to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not
appropriate because the State's self interest is at stake.' ' In effect, then,
the Court held that the normal presumption of constitutionality is either
weakened or abolished entirely when the alleged impairment involves a
contract to which the state is a party.
The Court's new principle seems to be supported by common sense.
After all, there is a stronger reason to presume that the legislature is acting in
an impartial manner when it is considering a proposed law that may impair a
contract between two private parties, rather than one in which the state itself
has a direct pecuniary interest. 95 In the former case, it is reasonable to
assume that the legislature is in as good or perhaps an even better position
than a court to balance the private interests protected by the contract clause
against the public interest embodied in the police power. In the latter case,
however, the political reluctance of a legislature to raise taxes makes it all
too likely that it will turn to the most ready source of funds available, even if
this choice interferes with a preexisting contractual obligation. Thus, pre-
sumably in a case such as Blaisdell, the legislature had no particular reason
to favor the interests of the mortgagor over the mortgagee.
96 In United
if the police power interest was to be accomplished. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914) (city ordinances severely limiting railroad's right to operate
within city limits held constitutional despite prior state charter and contract giving railroad right
to operate within city); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (where the Court found
adoption of city ordinance prohibiting operation of fertilizing company within city limits
constitutional, notwithstanding prior legislative grant of corporate charter to operate fertilizer
company within city limits). In contrast, in United States Trust, the police power interest which
the legislature intended to further did not directly involve the bondholder's rights to adequate
security; other means of furthering the states' interests would have been available which would
not have impaired the bondholders' rights. 431 U.S. at 29-30.
92. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
93. City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
94. 431 U.S. at 26.
95. One problem with the Court's analysis is that, if the principle laid down is to apply to
all legislation in which the state has a direct pecuniary interest, it will apply to virtually all cases
involving the taxing and spending powers. Yet in other cases the Court has tended to give the
legislature wider discretion in exercising these powers rather than narrowing the scope of this
power. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
96. Since the legislation challenged in Blaisdell involved private mortgage contracts,
theoretically the legislature could exercise its impartial judgment. As a practical matter, how-
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States Trust, on the other hand, the legislature hiad a substantial financial
self-interest in the enactment in question. The Port Authority had long been
regarded enviously by proponents of mass transportation as one of the few
state agencies with surplus funds. 97 Consequently, that surplus was an
obvious source of money for the purchase of mass transit systems, particu-
larly when the only feasible alternative would have been to raise taxes in an
area that already has one of the highest tax rates in the nation.
On the other hand, the Court's conclusion in this respect is also subject
to attack. Where the interest of the state itself is at stake, arguably the action
of the legislature in impairing a contract is entitled to at least as great a
presumption of constitutionality as in other cases, since that action will
affect a public contract, a matter about which the state necessarily has a high
degree of concern. Indeed, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v.
Nebraska ex rel. Omaha,98 the Court said:
Usually, where a contract, not contrary to public policy, has
been entered into between parties competent to contract, it is not
within the power of either party to withdraw from its terms,
without the consent of the other; and the obligation of such a
contract is constitutionally protected from hostile legislation.
Where, however, the respective parties. . . are persons or corpo-
rations whose rights and powers were created for public purposes,
by legislative acts and where the subject-matter of the contract is
one which affects the safety and welfare of the public, other
principles apply. . . . The presumption is that, when such
contracts are entered into, it is with the knowledge that parties
cannot, by making agreements on subjects involving the rights of
the public, withdraw such subjects from the police power of the
legislature.
99
Furthermore, it can be argued that in many cases not involving the state's
pecuniary interest, political forces may exist that encourage the legislature
to impair a contractual obligation that are even stronger than those present
when exercise of the taxing or spending powers is involved. 100 Thus, the
Court's conclusion can hardly be called self-evident and merits much more
discussion than it received.
H. The Consistency of United States Trust with Prior Decisions
The most intriguing question to be answered in connection with the
ever, in times of general financial difficulty, political pressures tend to favor debtors more
strongly than creditors. Thus, it could be argued that in all cases involving legislation granting
relief to, or otherwise favoring, debtors at the expense of creditors, close judicial scrutiny is
proper.
97. See 134 N.J. Super. at 141, 338 A.2d at 842.
98. 170 U.S. 57 (1898).
99. Id. at 72.
100. The great number of mortgage moratoria acts passed during the Great Depression of
the 1930's can be used as an example.
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United States Trust decision is whether it signals the advent of a new era in
contract clause interpretation, as Justice Brennan's dissent suggests, 101 or
whether it is logically reconcilable with other recent decisions construing
that clause. Stated another way, does United States Trust signal a return to a
pre-Blaisdell attitude toward the contract clause or, alternatively, is it
consistent with the Blaisdell line of analysis? It has been suggested in the
previous section that the instant ruling is sufficiently different on its facts
from Blaisdell that no definite conclusions can be drawn based on that latter
case. 102 But what about subsequent decisions?
Perhaps the two most difficult post-Blaisdell opinions are those of
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park'0 3 and City of El Paso v.
Simmons.10 4 Faitoute involved a challenge by a group of bondholders of
the City of Asbury Park, New Jersey, to the constitutionality of legislation
passed by that state's legislature to deal with the growing problem of
municipal insolvencies caused by the Depression. That legislation provided
for a type of municipal receivership plan that authorized the state supreme
court, upon the application of creditors, to place an insolvent city under
control of a Municipal Finance Commission.105A supplementary act pro-
vided that a plan of adjustment or composition of the claims of creditors
could be submitted on their behalf to the state court. 106 If the plan was
approved by the city, the state Commission and the holders of a least eighty-
five percent of the municipality's outstanding bonds, the court was au-
thorized to accept the plan, which would then become binding on all
creditors, whether they had voted for it or not. The City of Asbury Park was
placed under the control of the Municipal Finance Commission in 1935.
Subsequently, a plan for the refunding of its bonded debt was submitted to
the state supreme court. The plan, in essence, provided for the exchange of
existing bonds for new securities with a maturity date thirty years longer and
with a lower interest rate than the present bonds. After the plan had
been approved by over eighty-five percent of the city's creditors, the
nonconsenting minority bondholders sued, claiming that the legislation
under which the refunding was made violated the contract clause. The
constitutionality of this legislation was eventually sustained by the Supreme
Court, for reasons discussed below.
The Faitoute case is the only one in the twentieth century in which the
Court has sustained legislation modifying the rights of preexisting bond-
101. 431 U.S. at 33-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. See notes 88-92 and accompanying text supra.
103. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
104. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
105. N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:27-34 to -39. 5 (West 1955).
106. Id. at -34 to -36.
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holders against a challenge based on the contract-clause. 17 This is especially
significant since the case also involved more drastic impairments of the
contractual obligation than existed in United States Trust or some of the
other cases in which the Court has deemed a given impairment unconstitu-
tional. In United States Trust, the states had eliminated a security provision
restricting the ability of the Port Authority to engage in the passenger
railroad business in certain circumstances; at the time this legislation was
passed, the credit rating of the Port Authority was impeccable and there was
no likelihood of its default in the foreseeable future upon any of its debt
obligations.108 In contrast, in Faitoute, two very fundamental provisions of
the old municipal bonds were modified. The maturity span of the new bonds
issued was thirty years longer than that of the old ones, and the new bonds
carried a lower rate of interest than their predecessors. Only the amount of
principal remained unchanged. Thus, the modification in Faitoute involved
not merely a security provision, but the basic financial obligation of the city.
In view of this, it might be argued that the decision in United States
Trust marks a new era in the evolution of the contract clause. Upon closer
examination, however, this conclusion is not inevitable. First of all, in
Faitoute, the Court based its decision on the fact that the bondholders' legal
right to sue the city on the basis of the shorter maturity date for payments of
principal and interest then due was, as a practical matter, an "empty right"
which could not be exercised meaningfully. 109 The Court pointed out that
the city's taxing power was not unlimited; no court would allow creditors to
interfere with that power and divert revenues needed for the preservation of
essential services to retire outstanding bonds. It then stated that the right to
pursue a "sterile litigation" is not a right protected by the contract clause.
Phrased differently, the Court in Faitoute seemed to be saying that there had
been no substantial impairment of the obligation involved therein because
the right to sue the city to collect the stated principal and interest did not for
all practical purposes exist.
The application of this same line of reasoning in United States Trust,
however, would not lead to a similar conclusion. The right of the Port
Authority bondholders not to have the debtor involved in the operation of
deficit-ridden railroads seems to be a very real and substantial right; indeed,
its very purpose is to prevent the bondholders from being stranded in the
107. The Court has, admittedly, decided only a handful of contract clause cases involving
municipal bonds. See W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935), discussed in notes
59-61 and accompanying text supra; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278 (1882); Murray v.
Charleston, 96 U.S. 432 (1878); Trustees of the Wabash of Erie Canal Co. v. Beers, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 448 (1862).
108. 134 N.J. Super. at 179, 338 A.2d at 864.
109. 316 U.S. at 510.
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position of the hapless plaintiffs in Faitoute who had no real choice but to
accept whatever the city chose to give them.
110
Secondly, the Court in Faitoute seemed to place emphasis on both the
good faith of the city and the unforeseen financial hardships that had
contributed to its problems. The Court seemed impressed by the fact that the
city was making a good faith effort to honor its commitments to its bondhol-
ders to the greatest extent possible consistent with its need to maintain its
essential operations. Furthermore, the advent of the Great Depression was a
factor not within the city's control and one which was definitely unforeseen
at the time the bonds in question were issued. Thus, the Court concluded
that "[t]he necessity compelled by unexpected financial conditions to mod-
ify an original arrangement for discharging a city's debt is implied in every
such obligation for the very reason that thereby the obligation is discharged,
not impaired. '" 111
One might argue that the Court might have invoked the "implied
condition" argument in United States Trust as well, and the fact that it did
not do so evinces a significant change in the Court's attitude toward the
contract clause. The circumstances surrounding the passage of the legisla-
tion repealing the covenant in United States Trust, however, were signifi-
cantly different from those existing in Faitoute. In the former case, the
repealing legislation was clearly of no benefit to the bondholders and was
designed solely to aid the states of New York and New Jersey. Furthermore,
there was no unforeseen change in conditions in this case that would lend an
aura of good faith to the legislature's actions, similar to that which existed in
Faitoute. Indeed, the fear of potential purchasers of Port Authority bonds
that it would become embroiled in the losing proposition of mass transit
110. Generally, experience seems to support the conclusion of the Court in Faitoute that
the bondholder's right to litigate against the state or municipality is useless as a practical matter.
The history of the 1930's is replete with instances of municipal officers evading service of
process by bondholders and even going to jail rather than ordering payment of the bondholder's
claims, despite a court decree to do so. In addition, courts generally would refuse to issue
mandamus orders requiring payment to bondholders in the face of other pressing needs of the
city. See generally Dession, Municipal Debt Adjustment and the Supreme Court, 46 YALE L.J.
199 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Dession]; Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of
Obligations of Public Corporations, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 28 (1933); Shanks, The Extent of
Municipal Defaults, 24 NAT'L MUNICIPAL REV. 32 (1935). There are, however, a few states
which afford a creditor of a municipality the right to obtain execution against private property
of the residents of the debtor taxing district to satisfy a judgment against it. ME. Rv. STAT. tit.
30, ch. 241, § 5053 (1965); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 530, § 8 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
2743 (1973). Had the Court in Faitoute been dealing with an example of such legislation, it may
well have reached a different result.
111. 316 U.S. at 511. As the Court has properly recognized, the public interest and the
values underlying the contract clause would not be served by so rigid an interpretation of the
clause as to destroy the financial capabilities of local governments altogether. While the
contract clause indicates that the Framers placed great value on the need to preserve the
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financing was precisely the reason why the 1962 covenant was inserted in
the bonds.I 2 At the time of the issuance of those securities, the bondholders
foresaw that there would be increasing political pressures on the Port
Authority to involve itself in mass transit and demanded some assurance that
the security underlying their investment would not be substantially damaged
by such an involvement. To allow repeal of the covenant precisely because
the fears of the bondholders had been realized would seem to constitute a
breach of good faith on the part of the legislature and a clear violation of the
legitimate expectations of the bondholders. 113 Thus, invoking the implied
condition rationale of Faitoute would appear to be contrary to the intent of
the parties.
Third, in upholding the refunding in Faitoute, the Court emphasized
the practicalities of the situation; the scheme adopted was the only way to
assure payment of municipal debt obligations while at the same time main-
taining viable city governments. The Commission, in adopting the refund-
ing plan, had acted with an intent to benefit the bondholders as well as the
city and, in fact, over eighty-five percent of the bondholders had approved
the proposal. Furthermore, there was some objective evidence that the plan
actually did benefit the bondholders since the market price of the old
defaulted bonds had risen substantially since its adoption.
114
The situation in United States Trust was far different from that in
Faitoute. There could be no good faith claim that the 1974 repealer bene-
fited the bondholders' specific interests. In fact, it eliminated a security
provision and gave them nothing of benefit in return. Indeed, the states
admitted as much, since under the terms of the 1962 legislation they could
have repealed the covenant with the approval of sixty percent of the bond-
holders; yet they had not even tried to do this, presumably because they
realized that the repeal would be unacceptable to those creditors. 115 Thus, on
its facts, United States Trust is much closer to the situation presented in
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,116 where the legislature was found by
the Court to have acted with studied indifference to the interests of the
creditor. In short, then, while one may question whether the Court dealt
fairly with the facts in Faitoute, one must conclude that on the basis of legal
integrity of market transactions, the very existence of a free market presupposes the existence
of stable governmental entities. Thus, the Court in Faitoute was, in effect, recognizing that the
contract clause does not prevent the legislature from taking reasonable action necessary to
preserve the kind of general economic stability necessary for the free market to function.
112. 134 N.J. Super. at 156, 338 A.2d at 851.
113. See notes 147-52 and accompanying text infra.
114. 316 U.S. at 513.
115. 431 U.S. at 28.
116. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
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doctrine, there is nothing in the latter opinion that is inconsistent with the
Court's pronouncements in United States Trust.1
17
More difficult to reconcile with the decision in United States Trust is
City of El Paso v. Simmons. 11 That case involved a challenge to legislation
modifying an 1897 Texas statute. 119 The original statute provided for the
sale of state public lands, with the proceeds to be allocated to the Texas
school fund. The terms .of sale were extremely liberal, providing for a down
payment of one-fortieth of the principal and annual payment thereafter of
principal and interest over an extended period of time. In the event of a
default by the purchaser on an annual payment of interest, the statute
authorized termination of the sale contract and forfeiture of the property in
question to the state. Most significantly, the original statute authorized the
vendee of land that had been so forfeited to reinstate his claim to that
property at any date in the future, merely by paying into the state treasury all
accrued, unpaid interest from the date of default to the date of reinstatement,
provided that the rights of third persons had not intervened during the
interim.
The apparent purposes of the statute were to encourage the home-
steading of virgin Texas lands and to raise money for the state's school fund.
After its passage, however, valuable oil and gas deposits were discovered in
Texas, and the provisions in question came to have substantial and largely
unintended benefit for speculators, who would buy up large tracts of land to
establish a right of reinstatement at a later date if valuable minerals were
subsequently discovered on those properties. As a result of this speculation
and a concomitantly large number of title disputes, the redemption provision
in question was amended in 1941, limiting the right to redeem to a time
period within five years from the date of forfeiture. 120 Simmons involved a
challenge to the 1941 amendment by the subsequent vendee of a purchaser
of a tract of state land who had originally acquired title to the property prior
to the passage of the amendment. When the plaintiff attempted to exercise
his right of redemption slightly more than five years after default, the state
refused to reconvey the land to him and subsequently sold it to the city of El
117. One may question the Court's assertion that the defendant's motive in providing for
the refunding of its debt obligations was really to benefit the bondholders. At best, there is
scant evidence given by the Court to support its conclusion. And even assuming, arguendo, the
correctness of this assertion, the Court's decision would still seem to deprive the bondholders
of the opportunity of taking no immediate action and awaiting the return of more normal
economic times when the bonds could be paid in full with accrued interest from the date of
default. See Dession, supra note 110, at 202-03.
118. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
119. 1895 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 47, as amended by 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 129, art. 4218f.
120. TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 5326 (Vernon 1962) (repealed 1977).
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Paso. A suit to quiet title followed, in which the plaintiff argued that the
1941 law, as applied retrospectively, violated the contract clause.
The Court rejected this argument. In so doing, it appeared to apply a
balancing test in weighing the state's police power interests against the
interests of private parties protected by the contract clause. The Court found
that the state had substantial interests in preventing speculators from reapipg
windfall profits as an unintended benefit of the original legislation and in
eliminating the resultant confusion over title to land, which had caused
excessive litigation. On the other side, the Court felt that the perpetual
option feature was of relatively minor importance to the original purchasers
of the land. It concluded, applying the presumption of constitutionality to
the legislation, that the state's interests should prevail.
121
Although not a municipal bond case, Simmons is closely analogous to
United States Trust, since both involve situations in which the challenged
legislation conferred a direct, pecuniary benefit upon the state while at the
same time infringed the contractual rights of private parties. Simmons is
perhaps even more difficult than Faitoute to reconcile with United States
Trust; but since the majority in the latter case did not overrule Simmons, it
seems safe to assume that the prior ruling is still good law. How, then, can
the latter case be distinguished from United States Trust? There are several
distinctions that suggest themselves.
First, the circumstances that led to the problems that the Texas legisla-
tion was designed to remedy were totally unforeseen at the time the original
statute was passed in 1910. At that juncture, it was assumed that the land
would be utilized for homesteading or for agricultural purposes and no one
suspected that it might be found to contain valuable minerals. The perpetual
redemption feature was designed to enable homesteaders or farmers who
had defaulted on a land contract to redeem it when a good year came along.
The discovery of oil and gas in Texas in the 1920's, however, led to the use
of the perpetual redemption clause by speculators as a form of option
contract, something never envisaged by the legislature. In turn, this led to
great speculation in the school lands, which inflated their market values to
the detriment of small farmers. In addition, it led to much litigation over
land titles among successive purchasers of the same parcel of land, all of
whom attempted to exercise rights of redemption whenever valuable miner-
als were discovered in nearby parcels.
122
121. 379 U.S. at 515-16.
122. The majority opinion in Simmons may'be based either primarily on (1) the desire to
prevent speculators from reaping unintended windfall profits or (2) the need to clear up
uncertainties regarding the status of land titles and to prevent excessive litigation over them. If
the former is the main basis for the Court's sustaining the legislation, then it is arguable that
Simmons was incorrectly decided, since the state's financial self-interest in undoing the effects
of what turned out to be a bad bargain is not strong enough to justify overriding the contract
clause. Indeed, it is precisely this type of situation which the contract clause was designed to
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In contrast, the situation that led to passage of the repealer in United
States Trust was not only reasonably foreseeable at the time the legislation
was passed but, in fact, was the very reason why the covenant itself was
inserted in that legislation. The legislative history, as described in detail in
the trial court's opinion, indicated that many financial experts believed that
involvement of the Port Authority in mass transit would seriously impair its
credit standing and ability to sell bonds unless some limit on the extent of
that involvement was included in the enabling statutes.1- Thus, it would
have been a much more drastic step for the Court to have allowed in United
States Trust modification of the deficit-limiting covenant than it would have
been for the Court to have allowed the remedial legislation in Simmons,
because in the former case the very fears that had led to the insertion of the
covenant in the first place became a reality, whereas in the latter case the
discovery of oil and gas deposits was not anticipated at the time the statute
was passed.
An analogy can be drawn in this respect to the use of the foreseeability
test by courts in determining whether the doctrine of impossibility of
performance should excuse the promisor from performing a contractual
obligation. In many cases involving the defense of impossibility of perform-
ance at common law or under section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the courts have refused to excuse the promisor if the contingency
causing the impossibility was reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract
was entered into.124 The rationale underlying this line of analysis is that a
party should be presumed to have intended to assume the risk of the
occurrence of such a contingency if he saw or should have foreseen it at the
time the contract was made, but took no steps to guard against it.1 5
Similarly, in the case of legislation that is challenged under the contract
clause, it can be argued that if a problem was foreseeable by the legislature
at the time a law was enacted affecting the rights of another, that body
should not be allowed to alter its previous position on which third parties
have relied, absent some drastic change of circumstances that was unfore-
seen at the time of the original enactment.
12 6
guard against. On the other hand, if the need to eliminate clouds on titles was the predominant
reason for the decision, then it rests on a more substantial basis. In this case, the legislature was
acting as an impartial social arbiter attempting to preserve economic order, not as a financially
interested party seeking retroactively to modify a bad bargain.
123. 134 N.J. Super. at 156, 338 A.2d at 851.
124. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Maple
Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974); U.C.C. §
2-615, Comment 1. See generally Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy, 54
N.C.L. REV. 545 (1976).
125. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
126. Obviously, there must be limits to the application of this foreseeability criterion, lest it
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In United States Trust, it can be argued that the passage of the Clean
Air Act 27 and the energy crisis, coupled with the Arab oil embargo, did
amount to such drastically changed circumstances as to justify the invoca-
tion of the police power by the state in order to modify the Port Authority's
contracts. 128 But, although different in degree, this was precisely the type of
event that led potential buyers of Port Authority bonds to demand the
inclusion of the 1962 covenant in the first place.1 29 Certainly, New York
City's traffic congestion and air pollution are not new phenomena.
The second distinguishing feature of Simmons concerns the importance
to the plaintiff of the provision that was impaired. In that case, the Court
indicated that the primary motivation of the original purchasers of Texas
school lands was to obtain immediate possession and use of those proper-
ties.130 The liberal redemption provision was merely a "sweetener" de-
signed to induce the purchaser to enter into the contract. However, since the
purchaser's right of redemption could be cut off if the land was sold to a
subsequent vendee after the original purchaser had defaulted, the length of
time during which this option would last was entirely fortuitous; it could
unduly limit the ability of the legislature to pass laws in furtherance of the police power. Thus,
merely because subsequent events are generally conceivable at the time a contract is entered
into should not be sufficient to invoke the bar of the contract clause. On the other hand, where a
specific provision of the contract is drafted to provide protection from some specific event, and
the subsequent occurrence of that event is a primary cause of the passage of consequent
legislation impairing that contract, invocation of the contract clause seems generally desirable
to protect the legitimate expectations and reliance of the contracting party. See notes 147-52
and accompanying text infra.
127. Although the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 to 18571 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)
(current version at42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (WestPamph. 1977) (amended 1977)), was initially
adopted in 1955, prior to the passage of the covenant challenged in United States Trust, it was
the 1970 amendments to the Act which greatly tightened permissible air quality standards and
gave greater impetus to the movement for increased mass transit in the New York area. See 42
U.S.C. 99 1857c-1 to 1857c-6f (1970).
128. Although the 1973 oil embargo instituted by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) was itself only a temporary phenomenon, it did focus the attention of the
country on developing shortages of fossil fuels and the consequent need for energy conserva-
tion. This in turn led to passage of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, which
contained specific findings that "[rnail service and rail transportation offer economic and
environmental advantages with respect to... energy efficiency and conservation. . . to such
extent that the preservation and maintenance of adequate and efficient rail service is in the
national interest." 45 U.S.C. § 701(a)(5) (Supp. V 1975). Also, in 1974, the New Jersey
Legislature passed the Emergency Energy Fair Practices Act. 1974 N.J. Laws, chs. 2, 6. Based
on these developments, it could be argued that the air pollution and energy situation had
deteriorated to a point far worse than which could have been envisioned in 1962, when the
covenant was passed, and that therefore legislative modification was permissible under the
contract clause. While this seems to be Justice Brennan's position in his dissent, 431 U.S. at 32-
37, 44-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting), it would seem that his argument that these events were
unforeseeable in 1962 is supported by slim evidence at best.
129. See note 27 supra.
130. 379 U.S. at 514-15.
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extend indefinitely if the land was not resold by the state, or it could be cut
off immediately if the land was promptly resold. In fact, the Court pointed
out, most of the land was promptly resold. For these reasons, the majority
believed that the redemption provision was not a primary consideration
motivating potential buyers to purchase such properties. However, this state
of affairs changed drastically following the discovery of oil and gas, since
the redemption feature made it possible for speculators to obtain what
amounted to an option on land by buying it, immediately defaulting, and
waiting to redeem until oil and gas were discovered nearby.
In United States Trust, in contrast, it is clear that the existence of the
covenant limiting Port Authority participation in mass transportation was an
important factor in inducing potential purchasers to invest in the Authority's
bonds. One may dispute whether, in fact, the covenant did provide substan-
tial protection to buyers in view of the existence of the 1.3 test and other
limitations on the Authority's borrowing powers. Nonetheless, it seems
clear that a reasonable and prudent potential buyer of the bonds could deem
the covenant crucial to his decision to invest. Thus, at least if one accepts
the majority's interpretation of the facts in Simmons, there is a substantial
difference in the importance attached to the contractual provisions that were
subsequently repealed between that case and United States Trust.
131
Third, in Simmons, the only effective means of correcting the prob-
lems created by changed circumstances was by modifying the perpetual
redemption provision. To clear up the uncertainty over land titles and to
prevent speculative inflation of land values that had been caused by the
original perpetual redemption provision, the only feasible remedy was to
alter the provision. Thus, the situation in Simmons was similar to that
presented in Stone v. Mississippi132 and other police power cases in which
the exercise of that power necessarily involved an impairment of the
contract.
In United States Trust, however, alternative means of dealing with the
problems that led to passage of the repealer did exist. In the first place, the
Port Authority was not the only governmental agency that could possibly
131. For a contrasting view, see Justice Black's spirited dissent in Simmons in which he
stated that:
To my way of thinking it demonstrates a striking lack of knowledge of credit buying
and selling even to imply that these express contractual provisions safeguarding credit
purchasers against forfeitures were not one of the greatest, if not the greatest, selling
arguments-Texas had to promote purchase of its great surfeit of lands.
379 U.S. at 530 (Black, J., dissenting). If the majority had accepted this contention, that the
perpetual redemption feature was of major importance, it would be exceedingly difficult to
reconcile the holding in Simmons with that in United States Trust.
132. 101 U.S. 814(1879). See cases cited note 91 supra.
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deal with the problem of mass transit. While it was relied on by the
legislature because of its relative financial well-being, another bi-state
agency could theoretically have been created and funded with general state
and federal revenues in order to deal with mass transit. 133 Secondly, even
assuming that Port Authority involvement was the only way in which mass
transit subsidization was practically possible, given the fiscal position of
both states, it is feasible that less drastic modifications of the covenant could
have been made that would not have impaired so significantly the security of
existing bondholders. For example, it would have been possible to amend
the covenant to exclude revenues derived from new bridge, tunnel and toll
road projects undertaken by the Authority, or to exclude the incremental
revenues derived from raising tolls on existing facilities. Alternatively, the
amount of the permitted deficits under the covenant could have been in-
creased without totally abandoning all spending limitations. In short, the
distinguishing factor in United States Trust is that alternative means of
dealing with the problem existed and, even if these alternatives were not
practically feasible, the legislature totally repealed the existing legislation,
without attempting to enact a compromise modification. 134 Fourth, the
challenged legislation in Simmons did not completely eliminate the pur-
chaser's right of redemption, but merely limited it to five years.
135 In United
States Trust, on the other hand, the legislature totally eliminated the
covenant in question, without apparent consideration of the interests of the
bondholders. In short, the balancing of interests evidenced by the legislature
133. Concededly, there are many practical difficulties which would make the formation of
another bi-state agency a difficult and time-consuming task. First, the legislatures of New
Jersey and New York must agree on and pass similar legislation creating such an agency, a task
not easy to accomplish, as was demonstrated by the difficulty in agreeing on the 1962 covenant
and its subsequent repeal. See 134 N.J. Super. at 159, 169-71, 338 A.2d 853, 859-60. Secondly,
as an agreement between two states, the bi-state compact must be ratified by Congress. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
134. The trial court's opinion indicates that several alternatives to repealing the covenant
were considered and rejected. In 1971, legislation was introduced in the New Jersey legislature
to extend the scope of PATH to include rail lines to Newark International Airport and Kennedy
International Airport, which the sponsors contended would be part of each "air terminal"
rather than a "passenger railroad" subject to the covenant. However, a negative opinion from
counsel foreclosed adoption of this scheme. Subsequently, a consulting firm was retained by
the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Transportation in 1971 to report on the
Port Authority's ability to finance an extension of PATH. The consultant concluded that the
only way this could be done would be to remove PATH from the Port Authority's control so
that the covenant would no longer apply. Third, in 1972 the New York Legislature passed a bill
repealing the covenant with respect to bonds issued after its effective date, but retaining the
covenant for bonds issued between 1962 and 1972. 1972 N.Y. Laws, ch. 1003. This bill,
however, was unacceptable to the legislature of New Jersey. 134 N.J. Super. at 170-71, 338
A.2d at 859-60.
135. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5326 (Vernon 1962) (repealed 1977). See text accom-
panying note 120 supra.
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in Simmons was not self-evident in United States Trust.13 6
One factor that does seem irreconcilable is the Court's attitude towards
the presumption of constitutionality. The Court in Simmons stated that it
"must respect the 'wide discretion on the part of the legislature in determin-
ing what is and what is not necessary.' "137 In contrast, the Court in United
States Trust indicated that where the financial interests of the state are
involved the normal deference that the Court grants to the presumption of
validity of legislation does not apply. 138 To the extent that the concerns
motivating the legislation in question in Simmons consisted of a desire to
prevent excessive litigation and speculation, it is possible to argue that that
case is not one involving the pecuniary interests of the state and that this fact
explains the difference in treatment evinced in United States Trust. How-
ever, the legislation in Simmons does confer financial benefits on the state
since the state, rather than the private individual, will reap the speculative
profits on the land, unless it is repurchased within five years. Thus, Sim-
mons does involve, to some extent, the financial interests of the state,
although perhaps not to the same degree as in United States Trust.
Conclusion
Historically, judicial construction of the contract clause has not been
one of the stronger areas of the United States Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence. 139 Litigation involving that clause has tended to produce opinions
that are nebulous and which often ignore prior cases that are directly
relevant. 1 0 Furthermore, they tend to badly divide the Court, thus produc-
ing a multiplicity of opinions in the same case.
Those contract clause cases dealing with the impairment of municipal
bond covenants are no exception to this general characterization. Indeed,
United States Trust was decided by a four-to-three margin, with two
justices abstaining. Thus, its precedential value is somewhat dubious, since
Justice Blackmun's opinion did not muster an absolute majority of the
Court. Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions and predictions may be
ventured as to the probable course of future contract clause litigation
involving municipal bonds.
The first major conclusion to be drawn from the opinion in United
States Trust is that the Court will give great weight to the importance which
136. See notes 158-61 and accompanying text infra.
137. 379 U.S. at 508-09.
138. See notes 92-100 and accompanying text supra.
139. See generally B. Wmcuv, THE CoNTRAcr CLAUSE OF THE CONSITUrTiON (1938); Hale,
The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARv. L. REv. 512 (1944).
140. E.g., El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
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the individual contracting parties attached to the covenant at the time the
contract was made. It has been observed earlier that the Court in United
States Trust has abandoned the materiality or substantiality standard that
prior contract clause opinions indicated must be met in order to determine
whether the legislation being challenged constitutes an impairment within
the meaning of that clause. 141 In its place, the Court now has indicated that it
is more in keeping with the policies underlying the formulation of the
contract clause to defer to the intent of the contracting parties, as long as a
covenant is not superfluous.
This hypothesis would seem to explain why Justice Blackmun's opin-
ion regarded as irrelevant the lengthy inquiries made by the trial court con-
cerning the effect of the repealing legislation on the market price of the
bonds, and the existence of other protective covenants in the enabling
legislation. 142 Instead, he focused on the legislative history, which indicated
that both Port Authority officers and prospective underwriters believed that
the bonds would be unmarketable without the protective covenant. Thus,
when he stated that the importance of the covenant to the bondholders is
irrelevant, he was saying that the Court should ordinarily honor the parties'
determination of the materiality of a given contractual convenant rather than
substitute its judgment on this point. Although never explicitly stated, this
tendency to focus on the parties' own determination of materiality can be
found in other recent contract clause cases as well. In Simmons, for
example, one of the reasons why the Court was willing to allow the
shortening of the perpetual redemption to five years was that it found that
this right was of little.or no importance to the original purchasers of the
land. 143 Similarly, in Faitoute, the Court emphasized that the purchasers of
the bonds must have anticipated some modifications of the stated terms of
repayment would be necessary in the event of serious economic prob-
lems. 144 Thus, it would seem prudent for prospective purchasers or under-
writers of municipal bonds to build a clear legislative history indicating the
importance that they attach to the terms and conditions stated in a municipal
bond indenture. The more evidence there is to indicate that a given provision
is important to the purchasers, the more difficult it will be for the Court to
sustain legislation impairing such provisions.
While the Court's shift to a standard of subjective materiality is signifi-
cant, one must be careful not to overemphasize its practical importance for
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Green v.
Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
141. See notes 63-68 and accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 69-74 and accompanying text supra.
143. 379 U.S. at 514. But see 379 U.S. at 530 (Black, J., dissenting).
144. 316 U.S. at 511.
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two reasons. First, it seems doubtful that the Court will carry this subjective
standard to extremes and hold that a truly inconsequential provision of a
bond indenture is immune from impairment under all circumstances, even if
the evidence is clear that the purchasers specifically desired it. In other
words, there are probably some limits of reasonableness to this subjective
standard. Perhaps the limits are found in Justice Blackmun's statement that
here the covenant was "not superfluous." 145 Second, in most cases, the true
intentions of the purchasers will not be as clear as they were in United States
Trust. The vast majority of municipal bonds are issued at a time when the
credit rating of the issuer, and therefore the marketability of the bonds, is
unquestioned. Thus, the terms of the bond indenture will be determined
unilaterally by the issuer and there will be no indications of the purchaser's
expectations and desires at the time of purchase. United States Trust was
unique with respect to the amount of legislative history generated in connec-
tion with the issuance of the bonds. This was largely due to the widespread
realization of the effect that Port Authority involvement in mass transit
operations could have on its credit standing. 146 However, in most cases the
Court will only be able to guess as to the expectations of the bondholders;
thus, in the vast majority of cases the difference between an objective
standard and a subjective one will be academic.
The second conclusion that might be drawn from United States Trust
relates to the significance of the foreseeability factor in contract clause
litigation. The Court's opinion seems to indicate that if the conditions that
led to the passage of legislation impairing a prior contract were foreseeable
and were contemplated by the parties at the time of their original agreement,
the Court will be reluctant to sustain the impairing legislation. 147 This would
be particularly true where the repealing legislation affected particular por-
tions of the contract which were specifically bargained for with a view to
those foreseeable conditions later realized. Specifically, in United States
Trust, underwriters and potential purchasers of the bonds correctly foresaw
in 1962 that conditions in the New York metropolitan area were such that
the need for public financial support for commuter railroad facilities would
intensify in the coming years, and that political pressures for Port Authority
involvement in mass transit would also increase in intensity. 148 It was for
this reason that the original covenant limiting Port Authority involvement
was included in the enabling legislation and in the bond indenture. Thus, it
would seem inequitable and unjust to allow subsequent repeal of the
covenant on which purchasers of the bonds relied merely because those
145. 431 U.S. at 19.
146. See notes 24-30 and accompanying text supra.
147. See 431 U.S. at 31-32; see notes 121-29 and accompanying text supra.
148. 134 N.J. Super. at 153-54, 338 A.2d at 849.
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conditions that were foreseen came to pass. Conversely, in Simmons, the
discovery of oil and gas that gave the right of perpetual redemption a great
speculative value was not a development which was predictable at the time
the legislation authorizing the sale of public lands was enacted. 149 There-
fore, the Court said that it was not inequitable to modify retroactively this
redemption feature in light of unforeseen subsequent developments.
Thus, the fact that a given covenant has been inserted into a bond
indenture to protect against specific developments that are foreseen as
threatening the bondholders' future security is a powerful factor militating
against the constitutionality of subsequent legislation repealing that
covenant. This is not to say, however, that foreseeability per se will
automatically immunize a municipal bond covenant against subsequent
legislative modification or repeal. As the dissent in United States Trust
correctly indicated, foreseeability, in itself, has never been a fundamental
criterion in contract clause litigation. 150 In a broad sense, everything is
foreseeable, so that sweeping applicability of that criterion would immunize
virtually any contract against subsequent legislative modification or re-
peal. 151 Thus, application of the foreseeability doctrine must be limited to
those situations in which (1) a specific event is predictable and (2) specific
provisions are inserted in the contract to protect the bondholders against the
occurrence of that event. These limitations explain why the legislation in
Faitoute was upheld, although it involved a more drastic modification of the
rights of the bondholders than did that in United States Trust. While the
possibility of national economic catastrophe is always theoretically possible
and, therefore, foreseeable, it is an occurrence of a generalized nature, and
one which would affect a great number of contracts made at a given time.
Furthermore, no specific limitations were inserted in the indenture agree-
ment in Faitoute designed to deal specifically with this type of occurrence.
Thus, the subsequent modification of the terms of repayment of the bond-
holders in that case does not shock the conscience in the same manner as
does the repeal of the covenant in United States Trust.1
52
The third major conclusion to be drawn from United States Trust is
that the nature of the contingency that has led to the legislation allegedly
impairing the contract is of great significance. If the circumstances leading
149. 379 U.S. at 511.
150. 431 U.S. at 59-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. See notes 121-29 and accompanying text supra.
152. In one sense, the legislation in Faitoute was a far more severe impairment of contract
rights than was that in United States Trust. Faitoute involved a primary impairment of the
bondholders' right to timely payment of principal and interest, while United States Trust
involved a secondary impairment of a covenant providing additional security for payment. It is
on a subjective level that the impairment in United States Trust is more severe, since it involved
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to legislative action have resulted from the conduct or the failure to act by
the issuing governmental agency, the Court will be much less sympathetic to
the legislation than if the emergency is the result of external forces beyond
the control of the legislature. United States Trust is an excellent example of
this phenomenon. Here, the problem with the deficit-ridden mass transit
systems of the New York metropolitan area had existed for virtually the
entire post-war era, yet the legislature had been unable to come up with a
satisfactory solution. 153 Finally, in 1962, the situation had deteriorated to
the point where requiring the Port Authority to take on commuter railroad
systems that would almost certainly generate large deficits would have
raised serious doubts as to the Authority's credit standing, so that the only
way in which it was financially feasible for it to acquire the deficit-ridden
Hudson & Manhattan line was to insert the covenant at issue in order to
placate prospective investors. Merely because the state legislatures allowed
the situation to deteriorate further, so that in 1974 they were compelled to
repeal that covenant, is not a satisfactory reason for taking that drastic step.
This factor is even more apparent in the case of Flushing National
Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp. ,1s¢ in which the Court of Appeals of
New York held that the moratorium on New York City notes violated the
state's constitution. While external circumstances had undoubtedly contrib-
uted to New York City's financial woes, the Court of Appeals felt that this
was no excuse for successive city administrations to conceal the true extent
of the problem through budget manipulations and misleading balance
sheets, which if made in connection with the issuance of securities in a
private corporation would almost certainly have subjected the individuals
involved to civil and criminal liability under the federal securities laws.
In contrast, those cases in which the Court has upheld legislation
impairing a contract have usually involved relief from circumstances beyond
the control of the issuer. In Faitoute, for example, the source of the problem
was the Great Depression of the 1930's, the causes of which clearly were
not within the control of the Asbury Park City Council.155 And in Simmons,
the source of the problem was the discovery of valuable oil and gas
following passage of the legislation authorizing the sale of school lands;
again, this was a factor that was not only unforeseen but also beyond the
control of the legislature. 156 It follows, then, that the Court is likely to be
the repeal of a covenant that was specifically bargained for by the bondholders and the
abrogation of which was being sought precisely because those circumstances which the bond-
holders had foreseen when they bargained for the covenant had come to pass.
153. 134 N.J. Super. at 148-74, 338 A.2d at 846-61.
154. 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
155. See notes 103-05 and accompanying text supra.
156. See notes 118-20 and accompanying text supra.
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more sympathetic to legislation impairing municipal bond covenants in
situations where the difficulties involved arise from such factors as a
generalized downturn in the economy, and less sympathetic in situations
where the difficulties of a municipality are a result of inept handling of its
own finances 157
Fourth, and perhaps most significant of all, it would appear that in the
case of legislation impairing municipal bonds, the Court will no longer
apply the presumption of constitutionality that it ordinarily gives to econom-
ic regulations enacted by a legislature. As a practical matter, this means that
any impairing legislation that, in theCourt's judgment, goes beyond the
minimum necessary to grant the required relief will be suspect and will have
difficulty in passing constitutional muster. 158 Thus, the legislature must
balance the interests of the bondholder and the issuer in determining whether
the impairment is permissible. If it appears that the legislature did not even
consider the interests of the bondholder, as in United States Trust, the
legislation will be presumed to be unconstitutional.
1 59
The importance of this shift in the presumption of constitutionality
cannot be overstated. Many contract clause cases, whether involving im-
pairment of municipal bonds or other matters, involve an exceedingly
difficult balancing of interests easily affected by any alteration of eviden-
tiary burdens. A shift of the burden of proof to the state has thus far been
invoked by the Court only in a few select areas, such as legislation involving
racial I60 and national origin1 61 classifications that are challenged under the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. If the Court in United States Trust is
saying that legislation furthering a state's financial self-interest is to be
treated similarly to laws involving other "suspect classifications" previous-
ly mentioned, one must wonder whether this position will be able to muster
the support of a fifth justice and thus become the position of a majority of
the Court. Until the Court again considers the question, it seems only
prudent to assume that the contract clause must be considered as a signifi-
cant limitation on legislation modifying the rights of municipal bondholders.
157. Although the case was decided under the New York Constitution and thus did not
involve the contract clause of the United States Constitution, Justice Breitel's opinion in
Fisuhing National Bank reflects this philosophy even more explicitly than does United States
Trust. See 40 N.Y.2d at 735-37, 358 N.E.2d at 851-52, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
158. See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
159. See notes 69-75 and accompanying text supra.
160. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
161. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
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